I. INTRODUCTION
Many risks facing firms and individuals are spread across the economy through government assurance programs. Prominent examples include bank deposit insurance, pension benefit guarantee funds, and hazardous material cleanup funds. A salient feature of many government assurance programs is that they lack any form of risk-based pricing.
1 Instead, they protect beneficiaries from adverse events for a price that does not vary with the individual's likelihood of loss. A common concern is that this practice may exacerbate moral hazard, raising the frequency of adverse events by lessening incentives for risk-reducing effort (Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Cooper and Ross, 1998; Akerlof and Romer, 1993) .
In contrast, risk-based pricing is widely employed in private insurance contracts.
This can attenuate moral hazard problems by rewarding firms with premium discounts for risk-reducing activities (Freeman and Kunreuther, 1997; Boyd, 1997) . In this paper, we investigate whether the absence of risk-based pricing in one class of government assurance programs results in less risk-reducing activity-and more frequent adverse outcomesthan occurs when comparable insurance is arranged in private markets. The policy variation between states in financing the cleanup of leaking underground fuel tanks provides a valuable setting in which to examine this question.
In the late 1980s, new federal regulations required gas stations and other owners of underground fuel tanks to demonstrate they are financially capable of (i) cleaning up underground fuel leaks and (ii) compensating third parties for consequential damages.
Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana soon created state assurance programs to subsidize firms' costs of complying with the new federal regulations. Although the risk of an underground fuel tank leak varies greatly with a tank owner's operating and investment decisions, the price to participate in these state cleanup assurance funds did not vary with the risk. Consequently, tank owners can have costly tank leaks and their consequential damages covered at state expense, while facing little (if any) program-related incentive to "take care" to prevent such leaks.
By the mid-1990s, Michigan's and Illinois' assurance funds became insolvent.
However, these states took radically different approaches to their insolvency crises. While
Illinois raised its gasoline excise tax to restore its program's solvency, the Michigan legislature terminated its state assurance program. Tank owners in Michigan subsequently turned to the emerging market for commercial cleanup and liability coverage in order to comply with the federal financial responsibility requirements. In contrast to state assurance funds, the price structure for market-based insurance gives tank owners incentives to invest in equipment that reduces the chance of accidental fuel tank leaks. This setting provides an opportunity to evaluate whether switching from a government assurance program to the private insurance market promotes risk-reducing activity and lowers the frequency of these adverse events.
Despite its importance, there are few studies that directly compare the performance of private versus public-sector insurance programs in addressing moral hazard. The empirical difficulty is that moral hazard is typically confounded with selection effects. For example, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) found that banks that were members of the Kansas state deposit insurance system had a higher probability of failure than non-members. As they point out, however, it is unclear whether the Kansas deposit insurance system attracted the most risk-prone banks (adverse selection), or banks tended to become more risk-taking once insured (moral hazard).
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Several attributes make our research setting more conducive to the study of moral hazard with government assurance programs. First, the federal financial-responsibility regulations require firms either to purchase private insurance or to participate in a state assurance fund. Because the two systems provide comparable insurance benefits but a state fund's cost is (largely) paid by taxpayers, it is a dominant strategy for any tank ownerwhether low or high risk-to use the state assurance fund. Only when a state fund is not available do tank owners acquire private insurance. Consequently, there is no sorting between private and public-sector insurance on the basis of a firm's private information about its risk propensity or its cost of risk-reducing effort.
Second, there is little reason to take a "reverse causality" interpretation of the data, in which accident rates in Michigan would have declined (relative to surrounding states) even if that state had not switched to private market insurance. In fact, the evidence available indicates Michigan should-and did-expect to have a larger future tank cleanup problem than other states at the time it decided to close its public assurance fund program.
That fact makes it difficult to interpret Michigan's policy change as an (anticipatory) response to, rather than a cause of, the state's subsequent change in accident rates.
The findings are quite striking. After Michigan's policy change the fraction of underground fuel tanks with accidental releases dropped by more than 20 percent, relative to surrounding states that maintained state assurance fund programs. This reduction corresponds to more than 3,000 avoided fuel tank releases in Michigan over the following eight years. At an average cleanup cost of $125,000 per release (GAO 2007) , this represents an aggregate cleanup cost savings for that state on the order of $400 million.
These findings have a potentially useful policy implication. The US Environmental
Protection Agency estimates that 12,000 new underground fuel tank releases occur each year in the United States. 3 Gasoline and other petroleum products that leak underground tend to enter groundwater flows; if undetected, this can pose a public health hazard by contaminating public drinking water supplies, and require costly remediation. 4 For the more than thirty states that presently operate state assurance fund programs, it would appear that adopting the risk-based pricing mechanisms used in private insurance markets may alleviate ongoing solvency crises and reduce the costly burden of future fuel tank accidents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background information on the technology and how firms can reduce the likelihood of underground tank releases. Section III summarizes the environmental regulations at issue and the incentives these regulations create. Section IV addresses the policy variation in three states for which we have detailed data: Michigan, Illinois and Indiana. Here we describe the key differences between private insurance and these states' assurance fund programs, emphasizing how private insurance contracts create risk-reduction incentives. Section VI summarizes the data and methodological issues. Section VII presents and interprets main empirical results, and Section VIII examines alternative explanations. Section IX concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND RISK-REDUCING ACTIVITY
In order to understand the effects of the government assurance programs we study, it is useful to briefly summarize the underlying technology, the risks it entails, and what "taking care" to prevent accidents means in this setting.
A. Technology
Most underground fuel tanks are located at retail gasoline stations. A small gas station typically has two tanks, and a large station may have five or six. From a regulatory and an insurance standpoint, they are treated as one system consisting of the tanks and underground piping, pumps, and ancillary equipment. The most common and serious cause of accidental underground fuel leaks is long-term corrosion (oxidation) of the tank or pipes, catalyzed by groundwater in the surrounding soil.
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While leaks underground are not directly visible, they are readily detected by several means. These include inventory monitoring and reconciliation, automatic leak sensors located in the tank system, and groundwater or soil vapor monitoring wells located near the tank system. Since 1993 all tank systems in the United States have been required to have some leak detection system in place. However, tank system owners can invest in more accurate detection systems than the minimum regulatory requirement, which enables a leak to be identified and rectified more rapidly.
The rapid detection of a tank system leak is essential to minimize its cost and avoid consequential damage to water supplies and adjacent properties. Small leaks can be resolved by removing the remaining fuel, replacing the tank and piping, and cleaning (e.g., excavating) any surrounding contaminated soil. Although total costs vary, in the early-tomid 1990's typical cleanup costs in these situations ranged from $60,000 to $100,000 per leak. 6 In contrast, a leak that remains unresolved will not stop on its own accord and tends to grow progressively worse over time, spreading into groundwater systems that may extend well beyond the station site. Once it has contaminated groundwater off-site, the total cost of remediating the leak can rise by a factor of ten or more. 7 In severe cases, fuel from leaking tanks can contaminate drinking water sources, forcing the permanent closure of municipal and private wells and acquisition of new water supplies. For these reasons, investing in equipment and operating practices that can prevent accidental underground leaks-and detecting and remediating leaks with alacrity-is desirable to minimize the total social costs of underground fuel storage.
B. Preventing Leaks: Maintenance and Capital Investment
Since the mid-1980s, new technologies have enabled tank system owners to greatly reduce the likelihood of an accidental underground fuel leak. Prior to 1990, near all underground fuel tanks were single-walled and constructed of bare steel that is prone to corrode. Two types of capital investments can greatly reduce this risk. The first, and most effective, is to replace a steel tank with one constructed of, or coated with, non-corroding materials (such as reinforced fiberglass). Installing a double-walled tank will further reduce the corrosion risk, to negligible levels. Short of replacing an existing bare steel tank, a tank system owner can invest in corrosion-attenuating equipment that will reduce the likelihood of underground tank leaks. Two main anti-corrosion technologies are available, with more effective systems carrying higher installation and ongoing maintenance costs.
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Tank system leaks can also be reduced, in severity and in likelihood, through assiduous operations and maintenance activities. These include regularly pressure testing the tank system, calibrating inventory monitoring systems after each fuel delivery, replacing 6 See EID (1993) or Soesilo and Wilson (1997) . 7 A 1990 Maryland study of ten sites with groundwater contamination calculated cleanup costs per site averaging $710,000, including $3 million to restore a community water source (Benton 1990 underground sacrificial anodes (a common means of corrosion resistance in steel tanks), operating impressed-current anti-corrosion devices, and the like. All of these activities are costly, and some require periodic closure of the facility and attendant lost revenue. The technical literature on leak prevention practices and technologies is extensive; useful surveys include Noyes (1992) , Durgin & Young (1993) , and Kreiger (2000) .
III. REGULATION AND ITS INCENTIVES
During the 1980s and 1990s, changes in federal and state regulations altered the incentives for tank owners to undertake risk-reducing measures. We address these changes next.
A. Federal Regulations and Owners' Responsibilities
In response to mounting scientific evidence and public concern over adverse health consequences of leaking underground fuel tanks, in 1984 Congress directed the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate public and private underground fuel storage tanks. 9 The EPA's final regulations, issued in 1988, had several distinct provisions: Financial responsibility requirements, tank-system technical standards, and disclosure and corrective action obligations. The first of these provisions is the impetus for the state-level policy variation we examine in this paper.
Financial Responsibility Requirements. The EPA's financial responsibility requirements require tank system owners either to (i) purchase environmental liability and site remediation insurance for fuel tank leaks from a qualified insurer, with a minimum coverage of $1 million per occurrence, or (ii) participate in a state-level underground storage tank financial assurance program providing comparable coverage. 10 Current compliance 9 40 CFR §280-281, implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Subtitle 1, Amendments of 1984. Underground fuel tanks were not a public concern until the early 1980s; in 1983, the CBS program 60 Minutes story "Check the Water" brought national attention to the potential problem of leaking underground gasoline storage tanks and public health. 10 Petroleum marketers can also comply by obtaining a surety bond, a dedicated letter of credit, or demonstrate self-insurance (40 CFR §280.90-115). Use of these methods is rare if a state assurance fund exists (EPA, 1995) .
documents must be supplied to regulatory agencies, and the penalty for noncompliance or lapsed coverage is high. State and federal regulators believe that compliance with financial responsibility requirements is (essentially) universal.
11
In creating these new obligations, Congress did not alter any tort system remedy available to third parties injured by a tank leak. Rather, Congress effectively concluded that such remedies alone are apt to be (1) administratively and socially costly relative to prophylactic regulation, 12 and (2) that the desired incentive effect of a pure liability rule for owners to "take care" to avoid leaks may be adversely tempered by the limited liability provisions of the bankruptcy code (Boyd, 1997) . This second concern is particularly acute with respect to the risk posed by underground fuel storage tank leaks at gasoline stations, as many are small businesses and the cost of cleaning up a substantial tank leak can easily exceed the present value of an individual station's future profit stream.
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Technical Requirements. Although regulatory changes to tank-system technical standards are not the focus of our analysis, they affect our interpretation of the data and merit note briefly. The EPA chose compliance dates for technical standards that differed for new versus existing ("grandfathered") underground fuel tanks. Any new tank or system installed after the EPA's final regulations issued in 1988 was required to have one or more leak detection systems, and to meet a basic requirement for corrosion resistance. In contrast, existing (grandfathered) tanks were obligated to meet the leak detection technology requirement within five years (by December 1993), and the corrosion-resistance requirement within ten years (by December 1998). In both cases, the corrosion resistance requirement could be met by retrofitting an existing steel tank with technology readily avail- The administrative inefficiency of a pure liability rule rests on the observation that tank leak litigation centers on competing expert testimony in geology, epidemiology, engineering, and other scientific areas that courts are often ill-equipped to evaluate. In addition, Congress recognized that time is of the essence in acting to resolve an underground fuel storage tank leak, for reasons discussed in §II.A. This makes corrective action and assured financing for it stipulated a priori by a regulatory agency preferable to the delay of judicial decisions regarding cleanup programs made in the course of civil litigation or a bankruptcy proceeding. 13 Although it is not essential to our interpretation of the data, questions commonly arise regarding the division of liability between owner and operator at franchised gasoline stations. Liability in these cases varies, depending upon applicable state franchising law, who holds title to the tank system, and any provisions regarding these contingencies in the specific franchise agreement. able in 1988.
The principal consequence of these technical regulations is that, even in the absence of any state-level policy variation, we would expect the frequency of underground storage leaks to decrease over time as older, sub-standard tanks are upgraded or closed to meet the 1998 deadline.
Reporting and Corrective Action Requirements. The 1988 federal regulations stipulate prompt reporting of underground storage tank leaks in any detectable quantity to federal and/or state regulatory agencies, and specify required corrective actions in detail. Importantly for our purposes, the penalty for failing to report a suspected underground tank leak is extraordinarily high, at $11,000 per day. 14 We discuss this and other incentives facing owners to disclose tank leaks in detail in Section IV.C below. It is useful first to summarize state policy responses to these federal regulations.
B. State Responses: Government Assurance Funds
The federal financial responsibility requirements generated a storm of political protest from gasoline retailers and small business advocates. Petroleum marketers argued that many stations would not survive because private insurance was not widely available, and expensive when available. 15 In response to these political pressures, many state legislatures created financial assurance funds for underground fuel tank leaks.
These state assurance funds function as a publicly-financed insurance program for tank system owners. In the event of a tank leak, the state assurance fund pays for the cost of cleanup at the site and third-party consequential damages. To participate in a state assurance fund program, a tank system owner must (1) pay a nominal registration fee (typically $100 per tank per annum); (2) comply with applicable technical standards for tank systems; and (3) promptly report (usually within 24 hours) any detected or suspected underground fuel leaks. Most state assurance fund programs were crafted so that participa-14 42 USC 6991(e). 15 See GAO (1987) or Boyd and Kunreuther (1997 In practice, this perspective has a potential to create mal-aligned incentives for tank owners to comply with tank technical standards. Still, whether or not the absence of strong incentives to prevent accidental leaks among state assurance fund participants is manifest in more adverse outcomes is an empirical matter. We now turn to the policy variation that informs this question.
IV. STATE POLICY VARIATION AND MARKET INSURANCE

A. State Assurance Fund Changes
Our empirical analysis examines three states for which comprehensive facility-and tank- 
B. Market Insurance and Incentives
Environmental liability and cleanup insurance for underground fuel tank releases is available on similar terms from a number of commercial insurance companies. In contrast to state assurance fund programs, these commercial insurance policies are explicitly structured to encourage risk reduction efforts. For example, insurance premiums reward owners for replacing tanks constructed of corrosive-prone material (bare steel) and aging tanks generally. A review of several major insurers' policies indicates that the primary factors determining commercial tank insurance premiums are the age of the tank system, tank and piping material and coatings, construction (single-or double-walled), contents, capacity, and the history of prior leaks at the facility. Premiums are also based on the number and types of leak detection systems in place, with lower premiums offered for more sophisticated detection systems.
Some evidence on the magnitudes involved is summarized in Tables 1 and 2 . Ta year-old tank. Premiums are discounted by 10% each for installation of an advanced leak detection system, additional corrosion protection equipment, and other preventive measures that exceed federal technical standards. In addition, this firm will not insure noncompliant tanks (bare steel tanks that lack corrosion protection equipment) at any price.
Insurers evaluate asserted equipment and tank system attributes (generally ex post), and are known to deny compensation if mis-reporting of tank attributes is evident.
19 Table 2 shows insurance premia for various common three-tank system configurations of different vintages as of 1997, which is approximately the mid-point of our study period. Comparing the rows, the table shows that premiums vary significantly across tank systems. Lower premiums apply if owners invest in equipment that is less likely to corrode and leak, and that have better monitoring and inventory control. Table 2 also reveals considerable variation in premia for the same system across insurers during the mid-1990s.
This price dispersion has reportedly diminished as the market has matured (Cohen, Kamieniecki and Cahn, 2005) .
A second contrast to state assurance funds is that commercial insurance contracts provide incentives for tank owners to "take care" through experience-rated pricing. For instance, the bottom row of Table 1 indicates that a prior accidental fuel release (a tank leak or spill) will increase the premium per tank charged by this insurer by 10-to-20 percent per annum. To our knowledge, no state assurance fund program incorporates experience rating-the most basic form of risk-related information-into its program participation fee.
Last, private market insurers engage in a variety of activities designed to promote risk-reducing activities by tank system owners. Some insurers issue newsletters that identify cost-effective technologies to prevent or detect leaks, which could conceivably reduce owners' costs of searching for and processing related information. Insurers also offer premium discounts and rebates to tank owners who purchase leak detection and tank system maintenance services from specific third-party providers. For example, the American Insurance Group's Environmental Insurance unit provides premium discounts to tank system owners who purchase compliance management and monitoring services from Tanknology-NDE International, a firm that specializes in tank system engineering and monitoring equipment (NPN, 1998) . While purchasing these third-party services does not necessarily change an owner's investment decisions, they are viewed by insurers as a cost-effective way to reduce moral hazard in operations and maintenance activities by gasoline retailers.
In sum, because the price of commercial insurance is closely tied to tank systems' attributes, leak history, and risk-reducing activities at the station level, we hypothesize that stations with commercial insurance are less likely to have accidental fuel tank leaks than stations participating in state assurance fund programs. Before turning to the data that can inform this conjecture, however, it is important to describe how leaks are reported.
C. About Leak Disclosure Compliance
The data we examine include all underground tank fuel leaks and spills (formally known as accidental releases) reported to, or discovered by, state regulatory agencies and commercial insurers. The issue we confront is whether this number of reported releases reflects the true number of releases discovered by tank system owners each year.
This issue involves both incentives and technological features of leaks and their detection. Consider first the incentives of a tank system owner participating in a stateassurance fund to report an accidental release. Because these owners are insured for cleanup costs (without limit) and state fund programs are not experience rated, the cost to a tank owner of reporting an accidental leak is the program's deductible (commonly $10,000
to $15,000 per incident). This cost is small relative to the costs of not reporting a leak, for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, federal law requires the owner or operator of an underground fuel storage tank to report a suspected accidental release to regulatory authorities within 24 hours (40 CFR §280.50). A tank owner or operator that fails to do so is subject to civil penalties of up to $11,000 per day (RCRA Subtitle I §9006(d)2). Second, a state assurance fund may bring suit to have the tank system owner cover cleanup costs in excess of what the state would have incurred if the leak had been reported in a timely fashion.
Both of these costs can be quite high, and are easily avoided by reporting a leak after its detection-providing little incentive for state assurance fund participants to "hide" a suspected release, and considerable incentive to report it.
Of greater concern to our analysis is the possibility that tank system owners covered by private insurance may fail to report accidental releases. Here the cost an owner incurs from reporting a leak is the policy deductible and future increases in experiencerated premiums. This increase is typically 10-20% of the total annual premium (or several hundred dollars per tank per year), and may continue for the service life of the insured system.
Offsetting this cost of reporting a leak is a markedly greater cost of not reporting it.
Commercial tank insurance is renewed on a yearly basis. When purchasing or renewing a policy, a tank owner has to make a detailed declaration of whether it has experienced an accidental release in the past. Non-disclosure of a prior release is a breach for which the insurer may legally rescind coverage, leaving the tank owner liable for the full cost of the cleanup. At this point, the tank owner is also immediately subject to the $11,000 per diem federal civil penalty for non-compliance with timely accidental release reporting requirements (of cumulated back to the date of the release). These losses substantially exceed any benefit of hiding an accidental release.
Beyond these incentives, technological features argue against the possibility that reported releases and actual (detected) releases would differ. As noted in Section II, underground fuel tank leaks do not stop of their own accord but tend to grow over time as the plume of fuel disperses through surrounding soil. As leaks progress, maintaining fictitious accounts showing continuously balanced inventories of fuels and fuel sales becomes increasingly untenable due to the progressive leak losses (this is especially true for electronic data produced by automating monitoring systems that tally cumulative net inventory changes over time in on-and off-site databases, a system preferred by commercial insurers). Suspicious inventory-balance records invite on-site inspections from state tank regulatory agencies, and on-site inspections of a station's leak detection systems will generally reveal an ongoing leak.
Most importantly, a leaking underground tank does not remain hidden indefinitely.
When an underground fuel tank is ultimately closed and retired, state inspectors require site testing by outside parties to verify that the tank is demonstrably removed (or rendered unusable in situ) and that the tank owner no longer needs to maintain insurance and compliance documents for it. The closure testing and final leak detection system inspections are designed to be diagnostic-that is, highly unlikely to falsely conclude a site is clean if, in fact, a leak has occurred.
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These features of accidental underground fuel leaks and their monitoring imply that not disclosing a suspected leak can-at best-simply postpone the inevitable costs of a cleanup. In such an event, all or some of the costs of the now-expensive cleanup will shift from the insurer (whether private or a state program) to the negligent tank system ownerwho, at this point, is now retroactively subject to the $11,000 per day penalty for not re-porting the leak in the first place. A tank owner in such a position may well declare bankruptcy, thus foregoing all future profits. In sum, under any scenario the expected cost to a tank owner from proceeding down that path significantly exceeds the expense of reporting a tank leak promptly.
The totality of these incentives and technological features leave us skeptical that tank system owners with commercial insurance are systematically less likely to report an accidental release than owners participating in state-fund assurance programs. Nevertheless, hard data on the prevalence of unreported tank leaks remains frustratingly elusive.
Intentional non-disclosure may still occur, although we are aware (from EPA staff) of only two such incidents during our 14-year study period. Still, for our purposes the central issue
is not whether unreported leaks occur per se, but whether the frequency of non-disclosure is greater with private insurance than with a state assurance fund. 21 To date, EPA officials who oversee compliance policies nationally assert there is no evidence that tank owners using state assurance programs and those using commercial insurance differ in reporting accidental releases.
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V. DATA AND MEASUREMENT
A. Data
We analyze tank releases using data from the state environmental protection and tank regulatory agencies in Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana. These states are especially informative for several reasons. First, all three of these states adopted substantively-identical state assurance fund programs in response to the federal financial responsibility regulations at about the same time (either in 1988 or 1989) . Second, each of these states maintains comprehensive data on all underground fuel storage tanks and accidental tank releases in the 21 In fact, it is conceivable that reporting might increase after a state switches to commercial insurance, since private insurers provide financial incentives (premium discounts) for station owners to install more sophisticated leak detection systems and to use third-party release monitoring services. This implies the likelihood that a leak might remain undetected or unreported is likely to be lower in states with commercial insurance. Our analysis of release rates is conducted at the facility level. Release data record only the facility at which a leak occurs, not which individual tank (if any) at the facility had a leak. This is a technological limitation: leak detection systems often do not distinguish which tank is leaking if several are located near the detector (which is common), and leaks can also occur in piping systems rather than from a specific tank. The states we examine began collecting comprehensive release data in 1990 upon implementation of their assurance funds programs. 23 The US EPA also maintains a national Corrective Action Database of underground storage tanks and releases, based on data voluntarily supplied by state regulatory agencies. Couch and Young (2001, p. 18 ) report this national database contains errors and inconsistencies for numerous states that are extensive enough to "compromise the validity of regression analyses performed on it." This shortcoming of the national data motivates our attention to three states that maintain higher-quality data on tanks and release events. 24 The data (and state and federal tank insurance regulations) also include underground fuel storage tanks at airports, railroad yards, car dealerships, municipal service lots, manufacturing plants, and other sites. However, the majority of underground fuel storage tanks are located at retail gasoline stations. Federal law excludes residential heating-oil tanks from financial responsibility regulations, and are not included in our data.
Summary information on the number of facilities, releases, and tank attributes by year for each state is listed in Appendix Tables A-1 Table A -2). These trends mirror the industry's view that only the most profitable, high-volume gas stations can cover the fixed cost of upgrading their tank systems to meet the federal regulatory requirements that were phased-in during the 1990s.
B. Measuring Facility Release Risk
Our empirical task is to measure accidental tank release rates, and whether they changed differentially across states after Michigan switched to private insurance. To do so, we compute two measures of accidental release risk by year and by state.
The two accidental release measures we analyze differ by whether or not they condition on a facility's status. Status is either active or closed. An active tank stores fuel during the current (calendar) year, while a closed tank has been removed or rendered unusable in situ (see section IV.C). 25 A facility's status is active if it has at least one active tank.
The distinction is important because there are two 'margins' on which a facility owner might respond to risk-based insurance pricing. One is to make capital investments and improve maintenance practices, as described in section II.B, that reduce the chance of a tank system leak. Such actions are not obligatory, however; a station owner might choose simply to pay high insurance premiums and not undertake any risk-reducing activities (beyond the minimum technical requirements). The second 'margin' to consider is that a station owner might opt to close a leak-prone facility entirely. This avoids the need for additional capital expenditures and/or higher insurance expenses after a state requires 25 Tanks that are de facto unused but have not been officially closed remain subject to technical regulations, reporting requirements, and insurance requirements.
commercial insurance, and will be preferred if these expenses are high relative to the station's profit stream.
Our data enable us to determine whether the policy shift to risk-based pricing affected only release rates at active facilities, or whether it is manifest primarily through the closure of facilities. To be precise, some notation is useful. Let A it indicate if the status of facility i in year t is active, and R it indicate if an accidental release occurs. 26 A state's total release rate in year t is P(R it ), where the probability P corresponds to drawing a facility at random from the population of all facilities in the state (active and closed). A state's active release rate is P(R it | A it ), the chance an active facility has an accidental release. These two measures are related by Bayes' law, which implies
where ~A it indicates a non-active (closed) facility. Newly discovered releases are occasionally reported at closed facilities, if a site is later retested prior to sale or re-development.
This means the last term on the right-hand side of (1) will be non-zero. However, this term is an order of magnitude smaller than the total release rate. Consequently, changes in the total release rate over time are overwhelmingly determined by changes in the active release rate, P(R it | A it ), and active status rate, P(A it ).
Because we observe the history of closures and releases from both active and closed facilities, we can measure the terms entering (1) 
The remaining terms in (1) are similarly measured by their relative frequencies. Because nearly all leaks occur at active facilities, we expect the active release rate to exceed the total release rate. However, the potential self-selection of more leak-prone tanks into closed status means the active release rate will tend to exhibit smaller changes over time than the total release rate.
One implementation issue is to define precisely the population of facilities, which enters the denominator of (3). The databases we employ contain reliable information (that is, a census of) tanks in the ground after 1986, when underground fuel tank reporting requirements were originally enacted. 27 In contrast, it is not possible to know (with any accuracy) how many tanks were removed in the 1970s or earlier decades. Cognizant of this, we define the total facility population in year t as the set of facilities that were active in at least one year between 1986 and year t. According to this definition, if a facility was closed and had all its tanks removed before 1986, it is excluded from the facility population. We expect this restriction is unlikely to materially affect our conclusions regarding the effects of risk-based insurance pricing, as a decision to close a facility before 1986 amply predates any of the tank regulations, insurance requirements, and state policies studied here.
One limitation of the data is that for some tanks we do not observe the installation year or, to a lesser extent, its closure year. Specifically, installation dates are missing for 13% of the tanks in Michigan, 17% in Illinois, and 64% in Indiana (Appendix Table A -3) .
While this does not impair measurement of releases or total release rates, it does complicate measurement of active release rates. We address this issue using a stratification and imputation procedure. The essential idea is that if a particular tank was closed in year s but its installation date is unrecorded, we set the tank's active status indicator, A it , for year t < s equal to the relative frequency of active status among all tanks in the same state that closed in the same year but with an observed installation date. This yields a time-varying estimated probability in place of the unobserved active-or-closed status of the facility, and we use this probability in computing the totals on the right-hand side of equation (2).
This probabilistic imputation procedure rests on a simple conditional independence assumption: the conditional distribution of tanks' installation years within a state, given the observed closing year, is the same whether or not the installation year was recorded in the data. Some support for this assumption comes from our discussions with the state database administrator in Illinois, who indicated that the major reason for missing data is that installation and closure dates are not viewed as essential to their enforcement activities and have not been coded into their electronic databases to date. 28 This suggests that missing installation or closure dates (in Illinois) may well be random, or at least unrelated to a tank's release propensity. However, in the Indiana data it appears that observed installation and closure dates are for disproportionately newer tanks (installed from the 1990s onward).
This does not affect the usefulness of the Indiana data on total releases, but means data from Indiana relating to facility status and tank age should be interpreted cautiously.
Overall we will place our primary emphasis on comparisons between Michigan and Illinois, with comparisons to Indiana serving as supplemental corroborative evidence. Details regarding our imputation procedure and related points are provided in the Appendix.
VI. RESULTS
This section presents empirical evidence indicating that after the policy change to a private insurance market, overall release rates fell in Michigan by more than 20 percent beyond the comparable changes in adjacent states. The data also suggest that after the change, tank owners in Michigan tended to "take care" of their tanks more than in Illinois. Table A-1) . So an annual reduction of 1.52 releases per 100 facilities corresponds to about 400 fewer accidental releases per year and roughly 3,200 fewer releases over our eight-year post-transition study period. Table 3 also indicates that compared to Indiana, Michigan's 'excess' absolute risk reduction (the differencein-differences) is even greater: 2.23 releases per 100 facilities annually. Taken together, these data suggest that Michigan had some three-to-four thousand fewer underground tank leaks over the eight years following its policy change than the number predicted by neighboring states' experience over the same time period. Given an average cleanup cost of $125,000 per release (GAO 2007) , this represents an aggregate cleanup cost savings for that state on the order of $400 million over eight years-before accounting for the value of any avoided consequential damage to water supplies and the environment. Figure 1 shows the difference in total release rates between Michigan and Illinois at an annual frequency. It indicates that the greater drop in Michigan's pre-versus post-period release rate, relative to the change in Illinois, is not driven by the data for any one particular year. Michigan's total release rate was consistently higher than Illinois' prior to the policy change (and through the 1995 reporting year). The difference in release rates between the two states falls immediately in 1996, after Michigan requires private insurance.
A. Changes in Total Release Rates
(A similar difference is observed once before, in 1993, which was the federal deadline to install or upgrade leak detection at "grandfathered" facilities. All three states' release rates fell that year, Michigan's slightly more than the others). After Michigan's policy change in 1995, its release rate not only falls relative to Illinois but is actually lower than Illinois' most years thereafter. The data and annual contrasts to Indiana exhibit a generally similar pattern (Table A-1) .
Are these differences statistically significant? Since we have a census of the facilities in each state, errors in mean release rates arise from mismeasurement, not sampling variation. When binary outcomes are recorded with (symmetric) misclassification errors, the standard error of the mean is maximized for a misclassification probability of .5. For our sample sizes, standard errors for the mean release rates in Table 3 with misclassification error are bounded by approximately 0.0014. (This assumes independent misclassification events across facilities). That means even with extraordinary measurement error in recording release events, differences in observed release rates larger than about 0.2 per 100 facilities are statistically significant. In administrative data like these, misclassification rates of 50% stretch credulity; the standard errors we report in Table 3 are based on a lower misclassification rate of 5%. Adjusting for within-facility correlation in release events over time (i.e., clustering on facility) yields de minimus changes in the standard errors, as only a small proportion of facilities have more than one release over the fourteen-year span of our data.
B. Mechanisms and Closure Rates
Why did accidental release rates fall more in Michigan than neighboring states after 1995?
Conceptually, it is useful to distinguish between three distinct mechanisms:
(i) Greater facility closure rates. Because releases at closed facilities are much less frequent, shifting facilities from active to closed status will tend to reduce a state's overall release rate. 29 A greater closure rate in Michigan-for any reasonwould tend to reduce its total release rate by more than neighboring states.
(ii) Greater selective attrition of the most leak-prone facilities into closed status in Michigan than in adjacent states. Note that selective attrition may reduce release rates in Michigan more than other states even if overall facility exit rates are similar-that is, even if (i) does not hold.
(iii) Greater risk-reducing effort at active (surviving) facilities in Michigan than in adjacent states. Tangibly, this means replacing or re-lining older tanks, improving maintenance practices, installing anti-corrosion equipment, and similar activities to reduce insurance premiums after Michigan's policy change.
The first of these explanations is potentially problematic for conclusions about the role of insurance pricing. Conceivably, high closure rates of gas stations during the 1990's could have come about for a number of reasons unrelated to insurance reform: adverse demand conditions, the federal technical standards requirements phased-in during the 1990s (section III.B), the industry's trend to replace smaller stations with larger facilities that have higher-profit convenience stores, and so on. These pose a potential concern if they resulted in higher facility closure rates in Michigan than in comparison states after 1995. We consider this possibility in light of the data next, and explanations (ii) and (iii) subsequently. Figure 2 In proportional terms, overall closure rates evolve remarkably similarly in both states from the early 1990s onward. Even during the 1995 to 1998 period, when the absolute number of active facilities appears to fall slightly faster in Michigan than Illinois, the actual proportion of facilities that were active-that is, ) ( it A P in equation (1) Michigan's policy change, insurance costs for a typical three-tank facility that complies with the 1998 federal technical standards are in the range of $1,000 to 3,000 annually (Table 2, rows 1-3). These amounts may be too small to have a significant impact on facility exit rates among compliant facilities-which are apt to be better-managed, more profitable establishments. The insurance cost increase at older, non-compliant facilities could be substantially higher, and perhaps high enough to drive out marginally-profitably establishments ceteris paribus. This may explain why Michigan's exit rate declines comparatively smoothly over the 1995-1999 period in Figure 2 , but Illinois exhibits an abrupt drop in the number of active facilities from 1998 to 1999. Both states' non-compliant facilities could not operate after the federal "grandfathering" provision expired in 1998 (without costly upgrades), but in Illinois there was little incentive to close a non-compliant facility before 1998. In sum, Michigan's insurance reform likely accelerated the exit of noncompliant facilities that would have closed after 1998 anyway, and appears not to have induced measurably greater exit rates among compliant facilities-which have low release risks and lower annual insurance expenses.
Facility Closings.
C. Changes in Active Release Rates
Explanation (ii) and (iii) above pointed to the possibility of changes in release rates at active facilities as a result of insurance reform. , calculated using equation (2). Note this is not a fixed set of establishments; its number declines steadily over time (see Figure 2 ). These active facility release rate changes and the total release rate changes in Table   3 have a mechanical relationship. Specifically, a greater decline in total release rates in
Michigan than other states implies a greater decline in the active facility release rate, and vice versa. This follows from equation (1), and two empirical facts: facility closure rates are similar in Michigan and Illinois (Figure 2 ), and changes in releases reported at closed facilities are empirically negligible at all three states. 30 Thus, the new information content in Table 4 lies not in the magnitudes but in their interpretation.
Because the set of active facilities is declining steadily over time in each state, changes in their release rates may arise from two conceptually different mechanisms. The first is direct risk-reducing effort at facilities that continue to operate. This is the earlier explanation (iii), and involves investment in risk-reducing technologies and their maintenance. Alternatively (or in combination), selective attrition of the most leak-prone active facilities over time, the earlier explanation (ii), would result in a progressively lower-risk set of surviving active facilities. Note that this mechanism would reduce active release rates, as measured in Table 4 , even if firms made no efforts at all to reduce release risks at ongoing establishments.
Which of these mechanisms accounts for the larger reduction in active release rates in Michigan, relative to the other states, after its policy change? Ideally, the most compelling data to address this question would be information on facility-level investments in specific risk-reducing technologies before and after 1995 (such as cathodic anti-corrosion protection equipment, tank re-linings, maintenance logs showing more frequent pressure 30 In the data, the release rate at closed facilities in Michigan during 1990-1994 is 0.0027 and during 1996-2003 is 0.0018, a decrease of 9 releases for every 10,000 closed facilities. The decrease in the release rate at closed facilities in Illinois is <1 per 10,000 closed facilities, and there is a small increase for Indiana of 9 releases for every 10,000 closed facilities. For all three states, the changes in release rates at closed facilities are two orders of magnitude smaller than the changes in total and the active release rates-far too small to help explain the overall decline in either.
testing, and so on). To our knowledge such data have not been systematically collected, and it is unclear they could be reliably assembled in retrospect. Nevertheless, we can draw some useful inferences about whether or not these activities must have occurred by examining surviving and attriting facilities separately.
Risk-Reducing Activity. The vast majority of facilities active at the end of our study period in 2003 were continuously active for the entire 1990-2003 period. Michigan's "excess" absolute risk reduction for the entire facility population (in Table 3 ).
The facilities examined in Table 5 are not likely to be representative of all facilities, as surviving facilities are apt to be more profitable than the average facility. Still, these facilities operated underground fuel storage tanks in the same location, with the original or replacement tanks and equipment, before and after Michigan's policy change. This leaves three possible explanations for Michigan's substantially greater decline in release rates among these states' continuously operated facilities:
(a) Greater direct risk-reducing activity, such as investment in new tanks, relining existing tanks, installing anti-corrosion equipment, improving maintenance practices, or similar efforts;
(b) Greater non-disclosure of releases that do occur in Michigan after 1995, financial penalties and insurer monitoring efforts notwithstanding;
31 Table 5 is constructed for continuously active facilities with observed installation dates of 1990 or earlier, potentially excluding facilities that were continuously operated but have unobserved installation dates in the data. The number of 'missing' continuous facilities is likely small except possibly for Indiana.
(c) A change in the rate at which steel corrodes underground in Michigan (relative to other Midwest states), for some unknown reason.
Explanation (a) has some direct support in the data. During the post-transition period, the fraction of tanks at continuously-operated facilities replaced each year was 40 percent higher in Michigan than Illinois (2.18% vs. 1.56%, respectively). The decline in release rates at surviving facilities in Indiana and Illinois is (presumably) the result of their periodic replacement of old tanks with new tanks as well, since new tanks are constructed to higher leak-prevention standards by federal mandate (see section III.A). Table 5 suggests their release rates have fallen by half as much as in Michigan, or about 1.6-to-1.8 releases per 100 facilities, as a result.
While we cannot completely rule out (b), we find it difficult to support for the reasons discussed in section IV.C. In addition, the facilities in Table 5 are long-term operators at (presumably) profitable locations, and therefore have high opportunity costs of violating federal leak reporting requirements and risking the loss of future insurance coverage.
We can find no evidence (nor plausible reason) to support explanation (c), which would seem to require a heretofore-undocumented change in Michigan's subsurface geochemistry-in the same year as Michigan's insurance reform.
Selective Attrition. The pre-and-post release rates in Table 5 for continuously-operated facilities are somewhat similar to the rates for all active facilities shown in Table 4 . Does this leave room for selective attrition as a contributing explanation for the larger decline in active facility release rates in Michigan (than other states) after 1995? Here the evidence appears to indicate yes, on several grounds.
First, consider the release rates from facilities that were active when policy transition occurred and closed operations prior to the end (attritants). The release rate in 1995 among these attritants was 10.1 % in Michigan, yet only 3.3% in Illinois and 2.7% in Indiana. This means that among facilities that experienced attrition, those in Michigan had a greater propensity for accidental releases than in the other two states. This seems consistent with selective attrition: even though the overall facility closure rate was roughly the same in Michigan and Illinois (and slightly higher in Indiana), the facilities that did close in Michigan were evidently more leak-prone than in other states.
Second, the tanks being closed in Michigan after its policy change were older, on average, than in Illinois. During 1996 During -2003 , the average number of tanks (not facilities) closed each year was substantively similar in all three states: 2,136 in Michigan, 2,469 in Illinois, and 2,569 in Indiana. However, the fraction of these tanks that were very oldinstalled more than 25 years earlier-was dramatically different. In Michigan, 41.4% of the tanks closed after its policy change were 25 years old or more. In Illinois the share was less than half as large, at 18.4%, and in Indiana it was 35.6%, over the same period.
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Is removing disproportionately old tanks a form of selective attrition? It is if tank age is a predictor of leak propensity. On this point, the evidence in the literature is un-
equivocal. An engineering study of the causes of accidental tank leaks at several hundred facilities in California during the 1990s indicated that over 75% of all leaks occurred in tanks (or piping systems) over 15 years old (Couch and Young, 2001 ). An independent study conducted for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality in 1995 reached similar conclusions, determining that tanks over 20 years old or with unknown age accounted for 64% of leaks during the previous decade (DEQ, 1995) . 33 We conclude that not only did ongoing establishments make greater risk-reducing efforts in Michigan than in other states after 1995, tank owners also tended to close facilities that would have a higher propensity to leak in the future. Note this second, selective attrition mechanism is not based on different state closure rates overall, which the data (in section VI.B) suggest did not occur. Rather, it attributes part of the differential change in active release rates between Michigan and neighboring states to which facilities were closed. Greater sorting of leak-prone tanks into closure in Michigan than neighboring states seems a plausible outcome of the switch to private-market insurance in that state, since tank attributes that are informative at predicting future accidental releases (such as tank age) are a major determinant of commercial insurance premiums (Tables 1 and 2 ).
32 During pre-transition period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , this share was 29.2%, 11.6% and 28.3% for Michigan, Illinois and Indiana respectively. 33 The reasons tank age is a statistically useful predictor of leaks are two. First, corrosion takes time (years) to develop. Second, regulatory changes after 1989 required new tanks to meet higher leak resistance standards. This means there is a pure vintage effect that results in most leaks occurring at sites with older tanks.
VII. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Observational studies of policy changes confront two fundamental questions: Did outcomes of interest change significantly after the policy did, and was the policy change the (only) cause? The data appear to answer the first question unequivocally. By any measure, the fraction of establishments that reported an accidental fuel tank release declined dramatically in Michigan relative to surrounding states after 1995. As a consequence, the number of costly accidental release cleanups in that state declined by thousands in subsequent years. The second question is more difficult to answer conclusively, however. Our preferred explanation-the adoption of risk-based insurance pricing in Michigan-stems from its theoretical appeal and ability to explain the empirical evidence assembled here.
Still, there are some other potential explanations for these changes, and it is worth offering some perspective on alternatives here.
A. Michigan Expected Less of a Tank Problem
Is it possible that the Michigan legislature made its policy change because it expected to have less of a problem with tank releases after 1995, and therefore believed its state assurance fund program was no longer needed? If so, then Michigan's decline in accidental releases (relative to other states) after its policy change may not be attributable to the switch to risk-based insurance pricing. That is, perhaps cause and effect are reversed.
The record and state-projected tank release claims in Michigan during the mid- More importantly, actuarial estimates of future liabilities predicted more than 3000 additional claims for reimbursement between 1995 and 1998. This is nearly the same number as during the state fund program's operations in 1993 and 1994 (see Appendix Table A-1), and corresponds to a higher projected release rate after 1995 than occurred in Michigan-or in Illinois, for that matter.
In sum, we find no basis to conclude that Michigan expected to have fewer releases in the future, or that it closed its public assurance fund because it believed claims would have declined in any event. Rather, it closed its assurance fund because the program was insolvent, its actuaries forecasted a growing net liability under the status quo, and the legislature wished to avoid raising taxes to fund an escalating public subsidy.
B. Michigan Enforced Technical Standards
Tank system technical standards can help reduce tank releases. Conceivably, an alternative explanation for greater decline in release rates in Michigan is that its regulatory authorities made greater efforts to enforce tank engineering and maintenance standards, especially after 1995.
In 2000, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a survey of state underground storage tank inspection programs. As summarized in 
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This study shows that after Michigan's transition to private-market environmental liability insurance, overall accidental release rates from underground fuel storage tank systems declined by over 20 percent, or about 1.5 releases per 100 facilities, more than surrounding states. This is a substantial change, amounting to three-to-four thousand fewer accidental releases over the following eight-year period. At an average cleanup cost of approximately $125,000 per release, this corresponds to aggregate avoided cleanup costs exceeding $400 million in that state. Those are the direct costs of cleaning up affected sites, and do not include business interruption costs associated with cleanup activities. More importantly, it also excludes the cost of consequential damage to water supplies and environmental harm from accidental underground fuel releases. This is not because these consequential damages are apt to be negligible, but because studies of their magnitude remain few and their representativeness is highly uncertain (Jenkins, Kopits, and Simpson, 2006) .
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Is Michigan's policy change and the adoption of risk-based insurance pricing the cause of Michigan's greater decline in accidental release rates? The evidence on causality is necessarily imperfect; there is no true element of randomization at work in our study design. Still, it seems difficult to identify any other theory capable of explaining all of the available evidence. We believe the most compelling case, and one that may be particularly valuable given the policy implications at stake, would be achieved by replication of these findings elsewhere. Specifically, as of 2007 nine states have followed Michigan's lead in closing their state-fund assurance programs (to new claims). 35 Since federal financial responsibility requirements are obligatory, this forces tank system owners to switch to commercial environmental liability contracts like those in Michigan. While some of these states' changes were complicated by additional provisions that confound the direct effect of insurance reforms on accidental releases, it is possible that others possess sufficiently reliable data to replicate the same study conducted here. If the main findings we report are 34 Simons et al (1999) estimate that a leaking (commercial) underground storage tank reduces the price of residential property within one block by 17%, and reduces the price of commercial property by 28-42%. Their study is based on detailed data involving ten leaking gas station sites in one county in Ohio. 35 These states (and assurance-fund discontinuation dates) are Wisconsin (1996) , Texas (1998 ), Florida (1999 ), West Virginia (2000 , Iowa (2000) , Delaware (2001 ), Alaska (2004 ), Arizona (2006 ), and Maryland (2007 .
confirmed independently for other states making similar insurance program reforms, the policy ramifications would be difficult to ignore.
With the desirability of replication in mind, we tentatively proffer some of these policy ramifications. According to the State Financial Assurance Funds Survey of 2007, eight states' underground storage tank financial assurance funds (including Illinois) are insolvent with outstanding liabilities totaling $2 billion (in these eight states). Moreover, the US EPA estimates that 12,000 new underground fuel tank releases occur annually.
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For the more than thirty states that continue to operate state assurance fund programs, it would appear that adopting risk-based pricing structures similar to those employed in private insurance contracts may alleviate ongoing solvency crises and reduce the costly burden of future underground fuel release accidents.
We would be remiss not to observe parallels with other government assurance programs, such as deposit insurance and pension benefit guaranty programs. The fact that these programs are normally subsidized with general tax revenue and exclude risk-based pricing mechanisms can lead to two adverse outcomes. First, moral hazard becomes a prominent concern. With pension benefit guaranty funds, for example, Cooper and Ross (1999) argue that unions and firms may have an incentive to agree to more lucrative employee retirement benefit packages if the government will cover pension liabilities in the event of bankruptcy. Similarly, banks and other financial intermediaries may take greater financial risks than they would be willing to hold in the absence of federal deposit insurance (Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995; but see Akerlof and Romer (1993) for an additional perspective on the 1980s savings and loan crisis). 37 The second shortcoming is that because participation in government assurance programs is usually subsidized and therefore cheaper than comparable commercial insurance, its existence may preclude the development of private insurance markets that identify efficient risk-reduction practices.
36 US EPA Office of Underground Storage Tanks, 2006 Corrective Action Performance Measures Data. 37 One early policy change proposed to address moral hazard in this setting was to condition federal deposit insurance premiums (paid by banks) on a measure of portfolio risk (Meltzer, 1967) . According to this principle, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) required the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to implement a system wherein each bank's premium would be reflective of the risks it posed to the insurance fund as a whole. The FDIC backed this change and implemented it a year ahead of schedule in 1993.
Several related questions remain for future research. First, this paper focused on an ex ante moral hazard problem, that is, whether a tank owner takes extra risk reduction efforts in response to risk-based pricing. There is also an ex post moral hazard problem, wherein a tank system owner has an incentive to exaggerate losses when making an insurance claim. Since a small but significant share 38 of tank systems are self-insured under the private-market regime but few-to-none are self-insured if a state assurance fund is available, it would be useful to determine whether the ex post moral hazard problem is more severe with government assurance funds. Last, there are also hybrid public-private partnership arrangements for insuring against environmental accidents. For example, the state of Washington uses a state-financed reinsurance program in which the state sells reinsurance to tank insurers at below-market prices for similar reinsurance. Private insurers are required to pass this discount on to tank system owners. It would be desirable to know whether this system is as effective in reducing accidental releases as the commercial insurance market studied here.
APPENDIX
This appendix describes the extent of missing installation and closing dates in the tank-level data, and the methods we employ to address it. A missing installation or closure date for a tank complicates our analysis because we cannot directly observe whether or not the tank is active each year. This affects the calculation of active release rates in equation (2), and the number of active facilities reported in Figure 2 . 
where s indexes years.
The second term in the summand, cannot be estimated directly because the out-of-service year is missing. To do so, we make a conditional independence assumption about recording missing information. The conditional independence assumption asserts that for all the tanks installed in year s and closed before 2004 in a given state, the probability distribution of the out-of-service year (between year t and 2003) does not differ with respect to whether the out-of-service year is recorded in the data or not. Formally, 
As indicated above, the proposed matching procedure hinges on the assumption of conditional independence. Is this a reasonable assumption? Our interview with Jan Spoor, the database administrator at the Illinois office of the State Fire Marshall, indicated that the major reason for missing information is that the office is understaffed and the missed information is not viewed essential (May 19, 2005) . She also noted that when a tank owners/operators reports obviously wrong information (e.g., installation year is 2040), the office codes it as missing. This suggests that the distribution of true installation and closure dates, given tanks with identical current status (in 2004), may be similar regardless of whether it was recorded in our data for Illinois. However, our analysis of the Indiana data suggests there are far too few old tanks among the subgroup for which we have complete installation data. This makes statistics involving active release rates and facility status for Indiana suspect, and is the reason we are circumspect in reporting them in the text. Table 2 Notes. Minimum deductibles noted in parentheses (where K=1000). All tanks are single-walled construction. Anti-corrosion equipment (cathodic) applies only to steel tanks. Source: EPA (1997).
Tank System Attributes Insurance Premia for a 3-Tank System (1997 $)
State Pre-transition (1990 Pre-transition ( -1994 Post-transition (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) Post Notes. Data exclude facilities permanently closed prior to 1986, when data reporting requirements commenced. 
Illinois Indiana
Prevalence of Missing Tank Installation and Closure Dates
For all tanks, the status (active or closed) in 2004 is observed. Percentages in each column may not sum to 100.0 due to independent rounding. Data exclude tanks at facilities permanently closed prior to 1986, when reporting requirements commenced.
Michigan
Illinois Indiana
A. Tanks Active in 2004
Total Observations B. Tanks Closed before 2004   Table A-3 
